Abstract Anderson-like ontological proofs, studied in this paper, employ contingent identity, free principles of quantification of the 1st order variables and classical principles of quantification of the 2nd order variables. All these theories are strongly complete wrt. classes of modal structures containing families of world-varying objectual domains of the 1st order and constant conceptual domains of the 2nd order. In such structures, terms of the 1st order receive only rigid extensions, which are elements of the union of all 1st order domains. Terms of the 2nd order receive extensions and intensions. Given a family of preselected world-varying objectual domains of the 2nd order, non-rigid extensions of the 2nd order terms belong always to a preselected domain connected with a given world. Rigid intensions of the 2nd order terms are chosen from among members of a conceptual domain of the 2nd order, which is the set of all functions from the set of worlds to the union of all 2nd order preselected domains such that values of these functions at a given world belong to a preselected domain connected with this world.
Anderson-like ontological proofs are understood in this paper as theories formulated in the 2nd order modal language with unary predicate of positiveness over 2nd order terms. The following have been adopted from Anderson's theory (see Anderson 1990) : the definitions of a god-like being (God is any being that has necessarily all and only positive properties), essence (A property A is an essence of an object x if and only if A entails all and only the properties that x has necessarily) and necessary existence (An object x has the property of necessary existence if and only if its essence is necessarily exemplified), and the three axioms: (i) if a property is positive, then its complement is not positive; (ii) the property of a god-like being is positive; (iii) any property entailed by a positive property is positive. 1 However, these three Anderson's axioms are not sufficient to prove the statement: God necessarily exists or God exists. They must still be supplemented with some non-modal and modal principles of the zero-, first-and second-order. But, in regard to the systems of axioms for Anderson-like ontological proofs, the aim should not only be to prove the statement: Necessarily there exists a god-like being. It should be possible to assert also other ontological statements. And it is certainly acceptable that some axioms and inference rules are forced by semantics with respect to them the strong completeness of particular Anderson-like ontological proofs is required to proving.
An interesting quality of Anderson-like ontological proofs considered in this work is that they employ free principles of quantification of the 1st order variables, in contrast to the classical treatment adopted by the present author in Szatkowski (2005 Szatkowski ( , 2007 , and classical principles of quantification of the 2nd order variables. The theories incorporate relative (in particular, contingent) identity, similar to them in Szatkowski (2007) but different from Anderson-like ontological proofs considered in Szatkowski (2005) incorporating absolute identity.
The rejection of the 1st or 2nd order universal specification: ∀xφ(x) → φ(x/t) or ∀αφ(α) → φ(α/τ ) is the key criterion differentiating 2nd order free logic from the 2nd order classical logic (cf. Fitting 2002; Fitting and Mendelson 1998; Garson 1984 Garson , 1991 Lambert 1997 Lambert , 2003 . Because there exists no commitment to impose/reject one of these principles in the presence/absence of the other, it is clear that one may distinguish 2nd order logic in which exactly one of the two universal specifications is rejected. What is important is that the choices between classical or free quantifications in the modal setting interact also with decisions about the presence/absence of Barcan formulas: ∀ξ Lφ → L∀ξ φ and converse Barcan formulas: L∀ξ φ → ∀ξ Lφ, where ξ is a variable of both sorts. In particular, Barcan formulas of the 1st and/or 2nd order are provable in all systems containing all instances of the axiom schemas L(φ → ψ) → (Lφ → Lψ) and MLφ → φ, the necessitation rule: If φ is a thesis, Lφ is a thesis, and the classical principles of quantification of the 1st and/or 2nd order. Converse Barcan formulas of the 1st and/or 2nd order are already provable in all systems which are obtained from these above by omitting the axiom schema MLφ → φ. It is possible to consider classically quantified modal systems of the 1st and 2nd order with converse Barcan formulas and without Barcan formulas of corresponding orders. 2 Seen from a syntactical point of view, it is also possible to consider free logic of the 1st and 2nd order with Barcan formulas of corresponding orders, but the main problem still lies in the question of how to treat such systems semantically. Complications as well as motivations for free quantification of the 1st and/or 2nd order variables in the modal setting may just be revealed by using semantic instruments.
There is not, and there could not be, any general catch grasp of the notions: absolute identity or relative identity of the 1st order variables in a modal context; they are doctrine-or option-orientated (see, for example, Griffin 1977; Noonan 1980 ). In our case, given the symbol x is a god-like being or simply x is God, the axiom (CI2) ((CI3)) says that an individual which is identical to (different from) God is such necessarily. The axioms (CI2 ) and (CI3 ) take the commitments of the axioms (CI2) and (CI3) to be necessary.
The optional definitions of the 2nd order equality 
, affect different axioms legitimating the treatment of the properties of a god-like being and (in some systems) necessary existence as terms of the 2nd sort. Juxtapositions of these optional definitions of the 2nd order equality with the relative identity of the 1st order terms are also far from arbitrary. Provided the modal operator free definition of the 2nd order equality is companionable with accompanied the -less axioms (CI2), (CI3), then the marked with modal operator definition of the 2nd order equality is companionable with accompanied the -marked axioms (CI2 ), (CI3 ). Note, in this context, the treatments of so called singletons I x ,
where
, as terms of the 2nd sort are also option-oriented.
Admittedly, the first step in the systematic study of any logic should be to establish its completeness or incompleteness with respect to some good class of model structures. And it should be said here that Kripke frames are strongly insufficient to characterize all modal propositional logic, and consequently-all their 1st and 2nd order extensions. Moreover, many well-known complete propositional modal systems have incomplete 1st order predicate extensions. It is an open question whether something similar holds between complete 1st order modal systems and their 2nd order extensions; in particular-it is valid for us-what consequences adding ontological axioms has. Some technical problems concerning the choices of a method to prove completeness of quantified modal logic additionally arise; cf. Garson (1991 Garson ( , 1984 , where J. W. Garson describes the difficulties in finding one general method of providing such a proof.
Model structures contain families of world-varying objectual domains of the 1st order-for comparison, any model structures as introduced in Szatkowski (2005) contain constant objectual domains of the 1st order-and constant conceptual domains of the 2nd order. Terms of the 1st order receive only rigid (i.e. world-independent) extensions, which are elements of the union of all 1st order domains. Members of these 1st order domains are called existing objects of the world in question. Terms of the 2nd order receive non-rigid (i.e. world-dependent) extensions and rigid intensions. It is necessary to introduce families of preselected world-varying objectual domains of the 2nd order; the preselected world-varying objectual domains of the 2nd order are simply subsets of the power sets of corresponding 1st order domains. Members of such world-indexed subfamilies are called existing properties of the world in question. Extensions of the 2nd order terms are allowed to vary from one possible world to another but they are always required to belong to a preselected domain connected with a given world. Intensions of the 2nd order terms are chosen from among members of a conceptual domain of the 2nd order, which is the set of all functions from the set of worlds to the union of all 2nd order preselected domains such that values of these functions at a given world belong to a preselected domain connected with this world. Members of this conceptual domain are called conceptual properties.
The question is: How to treat "satisfiability of formulas" in such model structures? More precisely, what to do with the satisfiability of formulas in the worlds in which the extensions of their free variables of the 1st and 2nd order don't exist? There are two differing ways of dealing with this problem. One is to allow undefined values-a formula φ is neither satisfied nor unsatisfied at a world w under an assignment a, if there exists a 1st order free variable x in φ such that a(x) does not belong to the 1st order domain indexed by the world w or if there exists a 2nd order free variable α in φ such that (a(α))(w) does not belong to the 2nd order preselected domain indexed by the world w. The difficulty with this proposal is that the inference rules of generalization of both orders do not preserve their validity. For example, the formulas L(∀αα(x) → β(x)) and L(∀xα(x) → α(y)) are valid, but ∀xL(∀αα(x) → β(x)) and ∀αL(∀xα(x) → α(y)) are not. 3 The other alternative, which we follow, says that even though there exists a 1st order free variable x in φ such that a(x) does not belong to the 1st order domain indexed by the world w or there exists a 2nd order free variable α in φ such that (a(α))(w) does not belong to the 2nd order preselected domain indexed by the world w, then they are members of other domains and therefore meaningful-consequently, the formula φ is required to be in the world w as either satisfied or unsatisfied.
The philosophical motivation for world-varying objectual domains of the 1st order and preselected world-varying objectual domains of the 2nd order lies in the idea that the objects and the properties in one world may fail to exist in another. 4 As a result, the universal specification of the 1st order, Barcan formulas and converse Barcan formulas of the 1st order are invalid in such structures. Similarly, if 2nd order terms were treated only as rigid extensions in the union of all 2nd order preselected domains, then the universal specification of the 2nd order, Barcan formulas and converse Barcan formulas of the 2nd order wouldn't be valid. The question is whether the universal specifications of the 1st and 2nd order are sufficient on the conditions of the constancy of 1st and 2nd order domains, respectively. It is extremely hard, if not impossible, to construct Kripke-type semantics with constant objectual 1st and/or 2nd order domains in which the universal specification of the 1st and/or 2nd order is invalid. On the other hand, it is not difficult to verify semantically that for every model with world-varying objectual domains of the 1st and/or 2nd order, Barcan formulas of the 1st and/or 2nd order are valid in this model if and only if it satisfies the anti-monotonicity condition: if world v is accessible from world w then the 1st and/or 2nd order domain of v is a subset of the 1st and/or 2nd order domain of w. And also, for every model with world-varying objectual domains of the 1st and/or 2nd order, converse Barcan formulas of the 1st and/or 2nd order are valid in this model if and only if it satisfies the monotonicity condition: if world v is accessible from world w then the 1st and/or 2nd order domain of w is a subset of the 1st and/or 2nd domain of v. Both equivalences together say that any formula is valid in all world-varying objectual domain model structures for Barcan formulas of the 1st and/or 2nd order and their converses if and only if it is valid in all model structures with constant objectual domains of the 1st and/or 2nd order.
So, the more natural model structures for modal theories of the 2nd order without the universal specification, Barcan and converse Barcan formulas of the 1st orderon the one hand, and with the universal specification, Barcan and Barcan formulas of the 2nd order-on the other hand, should be model structures with world-varying objectual domains of the 1st order and one constant objectual domain of the 2nd order, in which terms of the 1st and 2nd order obtain rigid extensions, respectively. However, there are reasons for rejecting such a choice. Firstly, we don't know how to characterize a constant objectual domain of the 2nd order, which should have some Footnote 3 continued worlds from a given one are supersets of the domain of the world in question. The requirement of nested domains guarantees that the inference rule of generalization of the 1st order already preserves the validity, whole undefined values of formulas in worlds are allowed. 4 In Szatkowski (2005) we proved strong completeness theorems for different Anderson-like variants of Gödel's theory with respect to classes of model structures containing constant objectual 1st order domains.
coherence to world-varying objectual domains of the 1st order. Secondly, if the sum of all 2nd order world-varying preselected objectual domains (without introducing the conceptual domain of the 2nd order) was treated as a constant objectual domain of the 2nd order in which terms of the 2nd order would obtain rigid extensions, then formulas of the form Lφ ↔ φ would be verified for all formulas φ not containing quantifiers of the 1st order. In order to avoid these difficulties we introduce preselected world-relative objectual 2nd order domains and a constant conceptual 2nd order domain. 5 The aim of this paper is to prove strong completeness theorems for all distinguished theories with respect to corresponding classes of modal structures, which is certainly of philosophical and theoretical import. The strategy of establishing strong completeness is borrowed from Thomason (1970) , which is essentially different from the method used by us in Szatkowski (2005 Szatkowski ( , 2007 . Of course, the statement: God necessarily exists is valid in all corresponding classes of modal structures.
Finally, a few words about related works. We limit ourselves only to works, in which ontological proofs considered were understand by the authors as modifications of Anderson's ontological proof, and additionally-they were based on free modal logic of the 2nd order. According to our knowledge of the literature, only Hájek's paper Hájek (2002a,b) satisfies such a criterion. Starting with the 2nd order modal logic, which is obtained by marrying the 2nd order classical logic-enlarged by absolute identity of the 1st order-with the propositional modal logic S5 (see, for example, the notation in Hughes and Cresswell (1968) ), Hájek firstly extends the language and the basis of this logic by adding an unary predicate E applied to 1st order variables and the axiom L∃xE(x), respectively; secondly, following Fitting (see, Fitting (2004) and Fitting and Mendelson (1998) ), he introduces the relativized quantifiers of the 1st order ∀ E and ∃ E as follows: ∀ E xφ for ∀x(E(x) → φ) and ∃ E xφ for ∃x(E(x) ∧ φ); and thirdly, he modifies Anderson's theory by replacing all 1st order unrelativized quantifiers by relativized quantifiers and then adds such a modified Anderson's theory to the whole, or he adds some versions of such a modified Anderson's theory which is obtained by applying at least one of the following three alterations: reducing the system of axioms, replacing some axioms by new axioms, or introducing a new definition of God-being. One can, of course, think of all these theories as having the free modal logic of the 2nd order as a basis, if relativized quantifiers of the 1st order are considered.
Anderson-Like Theories, Viewed Syntactically
The formal language L of Anderson-like theories is equipped with a 2nd order unary predicate P (P(A) is read: A is a positive property (or simply, A is positive), an existence determinator E, a necessity symbol L, two sorts of variables: x, y, z, . . . 1st order), α, β, γ , . . . (2nd order), Boolean operator: − (complementation), logical symbols: ∧, ¬ (conjunction, negation) and ∀ (universal quantifier) for both sorts of variables. The only terms of 1st sort are variables of 1st sort and terms of 2nd sort are formed from variables of 2nd sort by applying complementation of any finite (possibly zero) numbers of times. Thus, the set of terms of the 2nd sort and the set of formulas are given by the grammars, respectively:
The remaining propositional connectives: ∨, →, ↔ as well as the strict implication ≺, the existential quantifier ∃, the possibility operator M, the identity 1 ≈ and the inequality 1 ≈ for terms of 1st sort are introduced as follows:
= ¬∀ξ ¬φ where ξ is a variable of any sort,
Some comments on the symbol E seem to be useful here. Why do we commit to E the status of the existence determinator and not of the existence predicate? This last terminology is already standard in literature. In the first place, if predicates of the 1st order are understood to be properties of individuals and predicates of the 2nd order-to be properties of properties, then E isn't a property of individuals, or of properties, or anything. For this reason, P(E) is not a formula of our language. In the second place, even those who give to E the name: existence predicate, don't always handle it as a predicate (cf. Lambert (1981) , pp. 159-160). At this point it may be instructive to see how the formulas of the kinds: E(x) and A(x) are usually valued in model structures. And so, informally, a formula E(x) is satisfied under an assignment a at a world w iff the referent a(x) of x is a member of the 1st order domain of w. This means, the symbol E determines (what justifies our name: existence determinator) referents of 1st order variables to be members of appropriate domains. Now a formula A(x) is satisfied under an assignment a (or, under an interpretation I, if 1st order logic is in work) at a world w iff a(x) belongs to the referent of A with respect to the assignment a (or, with respect to the interpretation I) at the world w. Clearly the semantic statuses of both kinds of formulas are different.
Further definitions of G(x), α Ess x and NE(x) adopted in Anderson-like theories are borrowed from Anderson (1990) :
x is a god-like being or simply x is God
A Ess x is read: a property A is an essence of entity x, where A is a term of the 2nd sort
NE(x) is read: x necessarily exists.
Any Anderson-like theory will be determined by two groups of axioms and axiom schemas: obligatory axioms and axiom schemas and optional axioms and axiom schemas.
(I) Obligatory axioms and axiom schemas of Anderson-like theories are following (we assume that φ, ψ are formulas and ξ is a variable of any sort):
All what is needed for classical propositional logic, 
) where x and y are free (2.17) for z in φ,
Every Anderson-like theory must be equipped also with an axiom saying that the property of a god-like being is positive and therefore it must be legitimate to treat this property as a term of the 2nd sort. Thus, the following two axioms are obligatory for all Anderson-like theories:
where, of course, the symbol 2 ≈ stands for the relation of identity of objects of the 2nd sort i.e. properties.
However, the relation 2 ≈ can be introduced in Anderson-like theories in two different ways by the following optional definitions:
and it is clear that the translation of (2.23) and (2.24) to the original language depends on which optional definition of 2 ≈ has been applied.
Moreover, the choice of definition of 2 ≈ affects other obligatory axioms of Anderson-like theories. Those axioms take the form:
depending on which one of (2.25), (2.26) has been adopted.
What is important to note is that neither of two optional definitions of 2 ≈ provides what one might have expected of an identity relation. Indeed, the formula:
is unprovable on the basis of the definition (2.26), however, it can be proved if (2.25) is applied. On the other hand, the formula:
is unprovable on the basis of (2.25) but it can be proved if (2.26) is applied.
Some comments about particular axioms or axiom schemas are also desirable here. And so, the axiom (2.10)-called the thesis of serious actualism-can be seen surprising. Anticipating semantical considerations, this axiom says that if an atomic formula A(x) is true at a world w then any extension of x is an element of the 1st order domain of w. What is important, atomic formulas A(x) in the axiom (2.10) can not be replaced by arbitrary formulas φ(x); for example, substituting ¬A(x) for A(x) in (2.10) yields a non-valid formula ¬A(x) → E(x) in our semantics. In view of the thesishood in Anderson-like theories the usefulness of the axiom A(x) → E(x) lies in them that it interferes in our proofs of the ontologically meaningful theorems ∃xG(x) → L∃xG(x) (If there is a god-like being, then necessarily there is a godlike being), ∀xNE(x) (NE(x) holds for every object x) and P(NE) (The property of necessary existence is a positive property); see, T6, T10 and T16 in "Appendix". As a result of possesing the axiom (2.10) we are able to prove in any Anderson-like theory the formula: M∃xG(x) → L∃xG(x) (Possible existence of a god-like being implies necessary existence of a god-like being)-what is in the sprit of the ancient Anselm's principle. The formulas ∃xG(x) → L∃xG(x) and M∃xG(x) → L∃xG(x) were already proved by Anderson (1990) as an important part of his ontological proof. Further, as a result of possesing the axioms (2.21) and (2.22) we are able to prove in any Anderson-like theory the formula: L∃xG(x) ↔ ∃xG(x) (If necessarily there is a godlike being, then indeed there is a god-like being); see, T9 in "Appendix". For clarity, if our Anderson-like theories would be based on the propositional modal logic S5, then the axioms (2.21) and (2.22) would be superfluous. Finally, it may be also instructive to make a small comment on the axiom (2.18). Perhaps, in the reader's opinion, the natural tendency would be use the axiom (y)) . For the justification of our choice, we answer that the formula
e. the first formula is deducible from the second one in the context of other axioms of Andersonlike theories, and the converse deduction does not hold.
Throughout this paper, we will consider different Anderson-like theories, which will be denoted by appropriate acronyms. The first symbol of each acronym will be V A . Any Anderson-like theory employing the definition (2.26) will be given an acronym ending with the symbol and thus, theories employing (2.25) can be easily recognized by their -less acronyms.
(II) Optional axioms of Anderson-like theories are chosen according to the following criteria:
(i) treatment of the property of necessary existence, (ii) treatment of so called permanence, (iii) treatment of properties abstracted from expressions of the form I x (y) defined by:
(iv) characterization of modal operators.
As to (i), if we intend to treat the property of necessary existence as a term of the 2nd sort we should adopt an optional axiom:
and augment the acronym of theory with the symbol n.
As to (ii), we simply add the axiom schema
and augment the acronym of theory with the symbol p.
As to (iii), if we intend to treat expressions of the form I x (y) as terms of 2nd sort we should adopt an optional axiom:
and augment the acronym of theory with the symbol s.
Once again we wish to emphasize that the form of optional axioms (2.34) and (2.36) depends on which definition (2.25 or 2.26) of the relation 2 ≈ has been chosen. As to (iv), we choose one of the following:
and augment the acronym of theory by symbol 5, b, c or d indicating the choice that has been made. 6 Each Anderson-like theory has the inference rule: modus ponens, necessitation and generalization, respectively:
and the following borrowed from Thomason (1970) :
where x is not free in φ,
where x is not free in φ, ψ 1 , . . ., or ψ n , n > 0.
By Th we denote the inference relation determined by axioms and rules of the Anderson-like theory Th. Thus, for a set of formulas X and a formula φ we write: X Th φ to mean that there exists a Th-derivation of φ from X . Such a derivation is a finite sequence of formulas (derivation steps) each of which has to be justified in an appropriate manner. Each step of derivation is therefore required to be an axiom of Th or an element of X or a result of applying an inference rule to preceding step (or steps). Moreover, applying inference rules is subject to the following important restriction:
rules other than R1 are applicable only to steps which are obtained without using elements of X .
The following remark is relevant here. We have defined a Th-derivation of φ from X in a different way from this in Szatkowski (2005) , where we have rejected the inference rules of necessitation and generalizations and we have worked with modus ponens as the only inference rule and with so called clothed axioms. If necessitation and generalizations had been introduced, then their use must be restricted to theorems of a Th theory. But then the axiomatic basis obtained could easily be proved to be equivalent to the one we have used. However, we have chosen the more "modern and elegant" treatment. It still seems to be technically difficult, if it is really possible, to apply this treatment to theories considered here. These theories are determined except necessitation and generalizations yet by other complex inference rules, which makes such a mutual translation difficult.
An easy proof of the following elementary properties of the inference relation Th is left to the reader. 
Proposition 2.1 For any Anderson-like theory Th:
The set of all conceptual properties of the structure W will be denoted by C W . The additional conditions necessary for modal structures are:
By an assignment in a model structure W we mean a function a which maps variables of the 1st sort to members of w∈W D w and variables of the 2nd sort to conceptual properties of the structure (i.e. members of C W ). An assignment a is extended to all terms A by putting:
, for every w ∈ W and every term A of the 2nd sort. If a is an assignment, then the symbol a o ξ denotes the assignment defined by:
Of course, o is tacitly assumed to be an entity suitable for the variable ξ depending on its sort and both a and a o ξ are assumed to be assignments in the same structure. We say that assignments a, b agree apart from ξ (symbolically:
ξ is an equivalence relation on the set of all assignments of a model structure. The equivalence class of a with respect to ≡ ? ξ will be further denoted by {a ? ξ }. And for every w ∈ W, {a ? ξ,w } will be the subclass of {a ? ξ } defined as follows: (i) for every 1st sort variable x, {a ?
x,w } = b | b ∈ {a ? x } and b(x) ∈ D w , (ii) for every 2nd sort variable α, {a ?
α,w } = {a ? α }. It is worth nothing that {a ? ξ,w } is an equivalence subclass of {a ? ξ } iff a ∈ {a ? ξ,w }. A pair of the form W, a will be called model and the symbol | will be used for the satisfiability relation-the expression W, a, w | φ, where w ∈ W reads: the formula φ is satisfied in the world w of model W, a . If no misunderstanding is likely as to the particular structure W in which an assignment a has been chosen, we simplify the notation by writing: a, w | φ instead of W, a, w | φ. Given a model W, a , the satisfiability relation | is defined as usual, for any possible world w ∈ W by the following conditions, where x is a variable of the 1st sort, A is a term of the 2nd sort, ξ is a variable of arbitrary sort and φ, ψ are a formulas:
The set of all formulas satisfied in a world w of a model W, a will be denoted by Sat(W, a, w) or simply by Sat(a, w) , if the model structure in question is clear from the context.
As customary, we say that a formula φ is true in a model structure W (symbolically: W | φ) iff a, w | φ, for every assignment a in W and every world w ∈ W . The set of all true formulas will be denoted by Th(W). We also put Th(K) df = {Th(W) : W ∈ K}, for an arbitrary class of structures K. If X is a set of formulas, then we write W | X, K | X if X ⊆ Th(W), X ⊆ Th(K) respectively. We write X | K φ to express that for every assignment a in a structure W ∈ K and for every w ∈ W , if X ⊆ Sat(W, a, w) then φ ∈ Sat (W, a, w) .
The following fact is sometimes called substitution lemma. Its proof-a routine induction on the degree of complexity of φ-will be omitted.
Proposition 3.1 If A is a term of the same sort as a variable
We will need a certain subset W acc ⊆ W . Members of W acc are called accessible worlds and W acc is defined as the R-image of W . We also define inaccessible worlds putting W inacc df = W − W acc . We will define a class of so called special structures in which inaccessible worlds will be treated in a special way-they will be provided with a separate family E 2 of the 2nd sort domains. Thus, by a special structure we shall mean a sextuple of the form
G is an ordinary model structure and E 2 = (E w ) w∈W , where ∅ = E w ⊆ D w for every w ∈ W inacc . By conceptual properties of a special structure we shall mean those functions f ∈ W → w∈W (D w ∪ E w ) such that for every w ∈ W : f (w) ∈ D w if w ∈ W acc , and f (w) ∈ E w if w ∈ W inacc . The above restriction on the set of conceptual properties of a special model structure forces a revision of treatment of terms of the 2nd sort. Indeed, if a is an assignment in a special model structure W and w ∈ W inacc then we can no longer put: (A) )(w) because the value (a(−A))(w) has to belong to E w which has not been assumed to be closed under complementation. Thus, for w ∈ W inacc , we allow (a(−A))(w) to be an arbitrary element of E w and in effect, in inaccessible worlds of special model structures, the complementation-operator is deprived of its usual sense. Now, we will define certain classes of model structures which will play the role of semantical counterparts of Anderson-like theories. To each class will be affixed the same acronym as to its corresponding Anderson-like theory, however, the symbols: Proof We start with a computation:
Now, since R is serial (see 3.4) then R(w) = ∅ and therefore, (3.1) yields the implication: a, w | G(x) ⇒ a(x) ∈ G. The converse implication is obvious. Thus, a, w | G(x) iff a(x) ∈ G. And since, a,
x,v } such that b(x) ∈ G we immediately obtain a, w | L∃xG(x).
A Preliminary Machinery to Strong Completeness
Before we begin proofs of strong completeness theorems in the strict sense, we must present some preparatory technical results. Everything presented here is borrowed from Thomason (1970) . We will simply adopt this semantic machinery proving the completeness theorem for the 1st order free modal logic S4 to our Anderson-like theories.
We shall assume that all formulas have been arranged in some denumerable sequence: φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ i , . . .. We shall also suppose that some particular enumerations are fixed so that we may speak of the 1st, 2nd, . . . , ith, . . . variable of the 1st or 2nd sort, respectively.
Given a set X of formulas of L, we say that X is Th-consistent if there exists no formula φ of L such that both X Th φ and X Th ¬φ; Th-inconsistent, otherwise.
X is maximally Th-consistent if it is Th-consistent and for any formula φ of L that does not belong to X, X ∪ {φ} is Th-inconsistent.
Lemma 4.1 Let X be a Th-consistent set of formulas of L and M(φ
Proof By an easy verification. Proof By an easy verification.
Lemma 4.2 Let X be a maximally

Lemma 4.3 Let X be a maximal Th-consistent set of formulas of L and M(φ
Proof Let the assumptions of the lemma be satisfied and let M(φ 1 ∧· · ·∧φ n ∧ψ) / ∈ X and M(φ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ φ n ∧ ¬ψ) / ∈ X . Then, by the maximality of X, ¬M(φ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ φ n ∧ ψ) ∈ X and ¬M(φ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ φ n ∧ ¬ψ) ∈ X . And hence,
Two sequences of functions: f 0 , f 1 , . . . and h 0 , h 1 , . . . are defined as follows:
Lemma 4.4 For all i
where ζ does not occur free in ψ 1 , . . . , ψ i , ∃ξ φ, or any member of X , then X is Th-inconsistent.
Proof By induction on i, i > 0.
Suppose that X Th ¬ f 1 (ψ 1 , ∃ξ φ, ζ ) and ζ does not occur free in ψ 1 , ∃ξ φ, or any member of X . Hence, it follows that: (i) X Th Mψ 1 and
, if ξ and ζ are 1st sort variables; or (ii) X Th Mψ 1 and X Th ψ 1 ≺ M∃ξ φ ∧ L¬φ(ξ/ζ ) , if ξ and ζ are 2nd sort variables. In the case (i), we obtain X Th ψ 1 ≺ M∃ξ φ and X Th ψ 1 ≺ L(E(ζ ) → ¬φ(ξ/ζ )). Which, by R4 1 , yields X Th ψ 1 ≺ L∀ζ (E(ζ ) → ¬φ(ξ/ζ )). Applying now (2.5), (2.11), (2.9), R2 and R1 to the last, we get X Th ψ 1 ≺ L∀ξ ¬φ, and consequently, X Th M∃ξ φ ≺ ¬ψ 1 . Therefore, X Th M∃ξ φ ∨ ¬M∃ξ φ ≺ ¬ψ 1 , which implies X Th L¬ψ 1 , i.e. X Th ¬Mψ 1 . And we conclude that X is Th-inconsistent. In the case (ii), the argument is similar. (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ l , ∃ξ φ, ζ ) . And from the latter result, on the strength of the induction hypothesis, we obtain that X is Th-inconsistent.
In this way we have finished the proof of the lemma. Let X be a Th-consistent set of formulas of L. Let L be a language obtained from L by adding an infinite number of new 1st order variables X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . .} and an infinite number of new 2nd order variables Y = {α 1 , α 2 , . . .}. Moreover, suppose that the set of nonnegative integers was partitioned into denumerably many denumerable sets S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , . . .. We define the infinite sequence of Thomason's sets (in short, t-sets) X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , . . . of formulas of L in this way that X 0 = X and if X i was already introduced, then according to the following cases:
(0) i ∈ S 0 . Let ∃ξ φ be the alphabetically first formula of L of the kind ∃ζ δ such that: (i) for all x ∈ X , (∃ξ φ → φ(ξ/x )) ∧ E(x ) / ∈ X i , if ξ is a 1st sort variable, or (ii) for all α ∈ Y , ∃ξ φ → φ(ξ/α ) / ∈ X i , if ξ is a 2nd sort variable. Then, in the case (i) we put X i+1 = X i ∪ {(∃ξ φ → φ(ξ/x )) ∧ E(x )} where x is the first member of X not occurring in any member of X i or ∃ξ φ, in the case (ii) we put X i+1 = X i ∪ (∃ξ φ → φ(ξ/α ) where α is the first member of Y not occurring in any member of X i or ∃ξ φ; (1) i ∈ S 1 . Let∃ξ φ be the alphabetically first formula of L of the kind ∃ζ δ such that for all ς of X (or,
where τ is the first member of X (or, Y ) not occurring in any member of X i or ∃ξ φ; (2) i ∈ S 2 . Let y be the alphabetically first 1st sort variable of L such that for all
≈ y} where z is the first member of X not occurring in any member of X i and z is different from y; (3) i ∈ S 2n+1 , where n > 0. Let ψ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψ n ∨ ∃ξ φ be the alphabetically first formula of L of the kind (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ i , ∃ξ φ, τ ) } where τ is the first member of X (or, Y ) not occurring in any member of X i or in ψ 1 ∨ · · · ψ n ∨ ∃ξ φ; ∪{h n (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n , z , y)} Th χ ∧ ¬χ where z is a 1st sort variable not occurring in any member of X i or ψ 1 ∨ · · · ψ n , and z is different from y. From this, we would get X i Th ¬h n (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n , z , y) , and by Lemma 4.5, X i would be Thinconsistent-a contradiction.
Let X be a Th-consistent set of formulas of L. Let X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , . . . be a sequence of t-sets of formulas of L . By the normal Thomason's Th-extension (in short, normal t-Th-extension) of X in L we shall understand the extension of X ∞ = i≥0 X i to a maximal Th-consistent set of formulas of L .
Lemma 4.7 Let X be a Th-consistent set of formulas of L. Then, the normal t-Th-extension of X in L is a Th-saturated set in L .
Proof Let be a normal t-Th-extension of X in L . Then, Lemma 4.6 and the definition of the sequence of t-sets guarantee that fulfills the clause (i) of the definition of Th-saturated sets. To prove that fulfills the condition (ii) of this latter definition, let us assume that for every variable ζ of L , φ(ξ/ζ ) ∈ , and ∀ξ φ / ∈ . Hence, ∃ξ ¬φ ∈ . Thus, by the clause (0) of the definition of the sequence of t-sets: (i) there exists a 1st sort variable x of L such that (∃ξ ¬φ → ¬φ(ξ/x) ∧ E(x) ∈ , if ξ is a 1st sort variable, or (ii) there exists a 2nd sort variable α of L such that ∃ξ ¬φ → ¬φ(ξ/α) ∈ , if ξ is a 2nd sort variable. In both cases, there exists a variable ζ of L such that ∃ξ ¬φ → ¬φ(ξ/ζ ) ∈ . Consequently, ¬φ(ξ/ζ ) ∈ for some variable ζ of L -a contradiction. Evidently, the clauses (1)-(4) of the definition of the sequence of t-sets guarantee that fulfills the clauses (iii)-(vi) of the definition of Th-saturated sets, respectively.
Let X be a Th-saturated set in L and Mψ ∈ X . Moreover, suppose that the set of nonnegative integers was partitioned into denumerably many denumerable sets S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , . . .. By the special Thomason's Th-extension (in short, special t-Th-extension) of ψ in L we shall understand the union X ∞ = i≥0 X i , where X 0 = {ψ 0 } = {ψ} and if X i = {ψ 0 , ψ 1 , . . . , ψ i } then X i+1 is given according to the following cases:
(0) i ∈ S 0 . Let χ be the alphabetically first formula of L such that χ / ∈ X i and ¬χ / ∈ X i . Then, we put X i+1 = X i ∪ {ψ j+1 }, where ψ i+1 is χ if M ψ 0 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ i ∧ χ ∈ X , and ψ i+1 is ¬χ otherwise. According to Lemma 4.3, ψ i+1 is defined and
(1) i ∈ S 1 . If there is no formula of the kind ∃ςδ such that ∃ςδ ∈ X i , we put ψ i+1 to be ψ i , i.e. X i+1 = X i . If there is a formula of the kind ∃ςδ such that ∃ςδ ∈ X i , then we choose the alphabetically first formula ∃τ χ ∈ X i and according to the sort of τ : (i) if τ a 1st sort variable, we choose the first 1st sort variable u of L such
Suppose that for some k ≤ i, ψ k is ∃τ χ. Let u be the alphabetically first 1st sort variable u of L such that not occurring in any formula of {ψ 0 , ψ 1 , . . . , ψ i }.
The reasoning is similar, if τ is a first 2nd sort variable. (2) i ∈ S 2 . Let y be the alphabetically first 1st sort variable of L such that for all
If there is no formula of the kind M∃ςδ such that M∃ςδ ∈ X i , we put ψ i+1 to be ψ i , i.e. X i+1 = X i . If there is a formula of the kind M∃ςδ such that M∃ςδ ∈ X i , then then we choose the alphabetically first formula M∃τ χ ∈ X i and the first variable τ of L such that
Suppose that for some k ≤ i, ψ k is M∃τ χ. Let u be the alphabetically first 1st sort variable of L not occurring in any formula of {ψ 0 , ψ 1 , . . . ,
The reasoning is similar, if τ is a first 2nd sort variable. is h n (χ 1 , . . . , χ n , z, y) . is f n (χ 1 , . . . , χ n , ∃ξχ, τ ) } and τ is the alphabetically first variable such that
Lemma 4.8 Let X be a Th-saturated set in L and Mψ ∈ X . Then, the special t-Th-
Proof Let the assumptions of the lemma be satisfied. To prove that X ∞ is a Th-consistent set of formulas of L, it suffices to see that M(χ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ χ n ) ∈ X for every finite subset {χ 1 , . . . , χ n } of X ∞ . Hence, on the strength of Lemma 4.1, all finite subsets {χ 1 , . . . , χ n } of X ∞ are Th-consistent, which yields the Th-consistency of X ∞ . The clause (0) of the definition of special t-Th-extensions of formulas guarantees that X ∞ is maximally Th-consistent. On the other hand, clauses (1)-(5) of this definition guarantee that X ∞ fulfills clauses (ii)-(vi) of the definition of Th-saturated sets. Consequently, X ∞ is Th-saturated in L. To conclude the proof of this lemma, it must be still established that {φ | Lφ ∈ X } ⊆ X ∞ . For otherwise, suppose that there exists a formula φ of L such that Lφ ∈ X and φ / ∈ X ∞ . But then, owing to the maximal Th-consistency of X ∞ , ¬φ ∈ X ∞ . Thus, by construction of sets
and because M(ψ 0 ∧ψ 1 ∧· · ·∧ψ i−1 ) ∈ X , it follows that M¬φ ∈ X , i.e. ¬Lφ ∈ X -a contradiction.
Strong Completeness
Utilizing the above machinery, it is now possible to prove that for every set of formulas X and every formula φ: if φ is true in the class of all model structures corresponding to a given Anderson-like theory in which X is true, then φ is provable from X on the basis of that theory. We leave to the reader proofs of the converse implications, because we have no space for them here. 
Proof
Proof of (i):
We consider only the non-trivial case, when X V A 5 φ. Hence, X ∪ {¬φ} is V A 5-consistent. Our aim is to find a model W, a , where W ∈ V A 5, such that for every ψ ∈ X ∪ {¬φ} and for each w ∈ W, W, a, w | ψ. The proof is organized in three parts:
A. Construction of the frame W W W , R R R , B. Introduction of the 1st and 2nd sort domains, C. Proof of the Truth Lemma.
Step A:
We define W W W to be the family consisting of the normal t-V A 5-extension w 1 w 1 w 1 in L of the set X ∪ {¬φ} , the special t-V A 5-extensions in L of formulas ψ such that Mψ ∈ w 1 w 1 w 1 , the special t-V A 5-extensions in L of formulas ψ such that Mψ is a member of a special t-V A 5-extension in L of formulas ψ such that Mψ ∈ w 1 w 1 w 1 , etc. The members of W W W will be ordered in four following steps: 7
Step 1 We assign a rank to each w w w ∈ W W W (rank (w w w), for short). And so, we declare rank (w 1 Step 2 For every w w w ∈ W W W , we order the various special t-V A 5-extensions in L of formulas φ and ψ such that {Mφ, Mψ} ⊆ w w w. So, suppose w w w and w w w are distinct special t-V A 5-extensions in L of formulas φ and ψ, respectively, such that {Mφ, Mψ} ⊆ w w w. Then w w w is to precede or follow w w w according to whether φ precedes or follows ψ.
Step 3 , w w w is to precede w w w if j + r < j + r or, when j + r = j + r and r < r ; otherwise, w w w follows w w w . Now, let us suppose for induction that the set w n w n w n , n > 1, is already defined. Thus, there exist parameters j ≥ 1 and r ≥ 2 such that w n w n w n is the jth member of the W r W r W r . For each i, 2 ≤ i < r + j, we next put
and v v v precedes or equals w n w n w n }, and
In the case of V V V = ∅, w n w n w n is the last member of W W W . Supposing then that V V V = ∅, we define w n+1 w n+1 w n+1 to be the first member of V V V . It is easily shown, when w n w n w n is not the last member of W W W , that there not exist a member of W W W which follows w n w n w n and precedes w n+1 w n+1 w n+1 .
We define now the accessibility relation R R R on W W W : Hence, Lφ / ∈ w w w and, by the maximality of w w w, ¬Lφ ∈ w w w. Thus M¬φ ∈ w w w, and since M¬φ → LM¬φ ∈ w w w, then in view of Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 4.2, LM¬φ ∈ w w w. The last implies M¬φ ∈ v v v, which is equivalent to ¬Lφ ∈ v v v-a contradiction. So, R R R is Euclidean.
Step B:
We first prove the following two facts: 
LG(x w 1 ), therefore by Lemma 4.2 and Proposition 2.1(ii), LG(x w 1 ) ∈ w 1 w 1 w 1 . And, by applying to the latter the definition (R), we obtain that G(x w 1 ) ∈ w w w. For (ii): r > 2. Suppose now that G( 
Furthermore, by the same argument, we obtain (x w 1 1 ≈ x) ∈ w w w, and consequently, G(x) ∈ w w w, which finishes the proof of (••).
∈ w w w for every w w w ∈ W W W . Next, on the strength of T9 ("Appendix") and Lemma 4.2 we obtain that ∃x(G(x) ∧ E(x)) ∈ w w w for each w w w ∈ W W W . Hence, for every w w w ∈ W W W there exists 1st sort variable x w such that (G(x w ) ∧ E(x w )) ∈ w w w. Consequently, G(x w ) ∈ w w w and E(x w ) ∈ w w w for each w w w ∈ W W W . And in the same way as before we obtain that, for every w w w ∈ W W W , (x 1 ≈ x w ) ∈ w w w, which, by (2.29) and Lemma 4.2, implies that L(x 1 ≈ x w ) ∈ w w w for every w w w ∈ W W W . But hence, by applying (2.17) and Lemma 4.2, we obtain that E(x) ∈ w w w for each w w w ∈ W W W , which finishes the proof of (• • •).
Given some (any chosen) member w w w of W W W , we define
, it can easy be seen that this definition is correct. Now with each w w w ∈ W W W we associate the 1st order domain
order variable of L and E(x) ∈ w w w}, and we put To prove that for every w w w Step C:
The assignment a a a in the canonical V A 5-model structure such that for any 1st order variable x, a a a(x) = x, and for any 2nd sort term A and each w w w ∈ W W W , a a a(A)(w w w) = F(A, w w w), will be called a canonical assignment.
One can show that φ is of the form ψ ∧ χ : Then, a a a, w w w | ψ ∧ χ iff a a a, w w w | ψ and a a a, w w w | χ, by the inductive hypothesis, this last iff ψ ∈ w w w and χ ∈ w w w, so on the strength of Lemma 4.2 and (2.4), this last iff ψ ∧ χ ∈ w w w.
φ is of the form ¬ψ: Then, a a a, w w w | ¬ψ iff a a a, w w w ψ, and by the inductive hypothesis, this last iff ψ / ∈ w w w, and owing to the maximality of w w w, this last iff ¬ψ ∈ w w w. ξ,w w w }. This last, because w w w is V A 5-saturated, implies that ∀ξ ψ ∈ w w w. Suppose now that ∀ξ ψ ∈ w w w and that ξ is a 1st order variable. Then, by applying (2.8) and Lemma 4.2, it follows that (E(ζ ) → ψ(ξ/ζ )) ∈ w w w for every 1st order variable ζ . This means that, for every assignment b b b ∈ {a a a ? ξ,w w w }, φ(ξ/b b b(ξ )) ∈ w w w. In exactly the same way, using (2.6) instead of (2. 
Proofs of (ii)-(xii)
Putting together the proofs of Theorem 5.1(ii)-(xii), respectively, and of Theorem 5.2 (i). 
